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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Joseph A. Mondzelewski ("Mondzelewski") and his wife, 
Rebecca Mondzelewski, sued Pathmark Stores, Inc., and 
Supermarkets General Corp. (collectively, "Pathmark"), 
asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq. (the "ADA"), and 
Delaware law. The District Court granted summary 
judgment for Pathmark and declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction on the state-law claims. On 
appeal, Mondzelewski argues that the District Court erred 
in holding that he is not disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA because he is not substantially limited in the major 
life activity of working. In addition, relying on Krouse v. 
American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1997), 
which was handed down after the District Court ruled in 
this case, Mondzelewski contends that the District Court 
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erred in rejecting his retaliation claim on the ground that 
he is not disabled. We reverse the District Court on both 
grounds and remand for further proceedings in accordance 




A. Viewed in the light most favorable to Mondzelewski, 
the relevant facts are as follows. Mondzelewski, a 55-year 
old with a sixth-grade education, has worked at Pathmark 
for 35 years, first as a bagger and then as a meat cutter. In 
March 1992, he injured his back lifting boxes of meat and 
was treated by Dr. Henry, Pathmark's doctor, who 
diagnosed him as having a herniated vertebral disc. After 
Mondzelewski spent a short time on disability, Dr. Henry 
released him to work but restricted him from lifting objects 
weighing more than 50 pounds and from carrying objects 
weighing more than 25 pounds. Mondzelewski informed 
Pathmark of his lifting restrictions. 
 
In December 1993, Mondzelewski re-injured his back 
while lifting boxes of meat. After a few additional months on 
disability, Mondzelewski was again released to work with 
the same lifting restrictions, and he again provided a copy 
of the restrictions to Pathmark. 
 
Mondzelewski claims that, after returning to work from 
his second injury, Pathmark retaliated against him for 
asserting his right under the ADA to obtain reasonable 
accommodation for a disability. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(b)(5)(A). Mondzelewski first maintains that 
Pathmark unlawfully changed his work schedule. In 
Pathmark's meat department, workers were generally given 
schedules that allowed them free time in either the 
mornings or the afternoons. Some workers began their 
shifts between 6 and 8 a.m. and finished by 2 p.m., while 
others began at noon and worked until evening. In addition, 
workers generally were not required to work in the evening 
on weekends on a regular basis. Before his second injury, 
Mondzelewski's schedule generally followed this pattern, 
but after his second injury, Pathmark assigned him to work 
from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and consistently required him 
to work on Saturday evenings. According to Mondzelewski 
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and his fellow workers, these shifts were considered 
"punishment shifts." App. 122-125. 
 
Mondzelewski also contends that he was given several 
retaliatory reprimands. First, Mondzelewski stated in his 
deposition that he received an oral warning for taking his 
work break during the last hour of his shift and that no 
other employees were given such warnings. Second, 
Mondzelewski was given a written notice of counseling 
because he had "left ground beef in [the] case" instead of 
making "frozen patties" or "consult[ing] management for 
direction." App. 138. Mondzelewski described this notice as 
one for grinding up too much meat, and he asserted that it 
was not unusual for employees to grind up more meat than 
could be sold. App. 81-82. Although this notice stated that 
it was for "counseling only," it also stated that "future 
violations will result in additional disciplinary action 
including separation." App. 138. Mondzelewski claims that 
this was the first written reprimand he had ever received 
during his 35-year career at Pathmark. 
 
Last, within a week of the earlier written notice, 
Mondzelewski received another written notice for 
"insubordination" for refusing to lift a piece of meat. The 
meat was unmarked as to its weight, but Mondzelewski 
estimated it to weigh between 50 and 100 pounds. Because 
his co-worker refused to assist in lifting the meat, 
Mondzelewski called on a department manager for help. 
Instead of offering assistance, Mondzelewski claims the 
department manager wrote specific weights on this and 
other pieces of meat without actually weighing them. The 
department manager then allegedly told Mondzelewski to 
lift the meat stating: "You want to play those[expletive] 
games, well, I'm not. You want a write up. I'm telling you to 
do these chucks. You either do it or you go home." App. 45. 
Mondzelewski refused, and as a result, he was written up 
and suspended for the afternoon. Like his previous written 
notice, this notice stated that "future violations will result 
in additional disciplinary action including separation." App. 
139. At a grievance meeting to discuss the matter, 
Mondzelewski was told, he asserts, that his restrictions 
were disrupting the work of his fellow employees. 
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Mondzelewski asserts that on one occasion his supervisor 
refused to give him time off for a medical test and told him 
he would have to reschedule it. He also stated that on some 
occasions the department manager refused his request for 
help in lifting meat and said: "Things are not that heavy. 
You can pick that up." App. 48. 
 
Finally, Mondzelewski claims that Pathmark's managers 
and employees harassed and humiliated him. Mondzelewski 
was sent to a worker's compensation seminar at which a 
speaker said that some employees fake accidents. On 
another occasion, he states, he was not given a"butcher's 
white coat" and was told it was because he would not be 
around much longer. At another time, he was allegedly told 
that Pathmark should release him and find him a job 
pumping gas. Moreover, he stated that he was told: "We 
don't need a meat cutter. We don't need a wrapper, and we 
don't need you." App. 83. Further, Mondzelewski asserts 
that a manager made a derogatory and offensive hand 
gesture to his wife and him. 
 
Mondzelewski claims that Pathmark's conduct caused 
him to suffer a mental breakdown and to miss work for 
several months. During this period, he filed a charge 
against Pathmark with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC"). Later that year, he returned to work, 
but he was assigned to a different store in order to prevent 
any further acts of retaliation. At present, Mondzelewski 
continues to work at Pathmark, and according to him, the 
harassment has ended. However, he states that he 
continues to require medication and psychological 
counseling. 
 
B. Mondzelewski filed a six-count complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware. 
Count I alleged that Pathmark discriminated against him, 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 12112, by failing to provide 
reasonable accommodation for his lifting restrictions. Count 
II claimed that Pathmark violated 42 U.S.C. S 12203 by 
retaliating against him for requesting a reasonable 
accommodation when he returned to work after his second 
injury. Count III asserted that Pathmark violated a 
Delaware statute, 19 Del. Code S 2365, by retaliating 
against him for filing a worker's compensation claim. 
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Counts IV and V alleged common law torts, and Count VI 
asserted injury to the Mondzelewskis' marital relationship. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment for 
Pathmark on the federal claims. See Mondzelewski v. 
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 277 (D. Del. 1997). The 
Court first held (id. at 279-81) that Mondzelewski was not 
disabled under the ADA because his back injury did not 
"substantially limit[ ]" him in the"major life activities" of 
"lifting" or "working." See 42 U.S.C.S 12102(2)(A) (defining 
a "disability" as including "a physical . .. impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities 
of such individual"). In an effort to show that he was 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, 
Mondzelewski provided a report by Thomas Yohe, a 
vocational expert, which detailed Mondzelewski's job 
prospects. However, the District Court held that Yohe's 
report "fail[ed] to raise a material issue of fact on 
Mondzelewski's claim for several reasons," including its 
failure to "relate the effect of Mondzelewski's `medium-duty 
restrictions' on his ability to perform jobs in the economy" 
and its failure to "quantify the number or type of jobs he is 
precluded from performing due to those restrictions." 
Mondzelewski, 976 F. Supp. at 281. Most important, the 
Court stressed that Mondzelewski's "employability 
problems" were not caused by his impairment, but rather 
by his "personal characteristics [such as his limited 
education, training, and skills] that ha[d] nothing to do with 
his impairment." Id. Accordingly, the Court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants on Count I. 
 
Turning to Mondzelewski's retaliation claim, the Court 
held that "Mondzelewski may not assert a claim for 
retaliation because he is not disabled." Mondzelewski, 976 
F. Supp. at 282. The court went on to note precedent to the 
effect that a plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation case must 
show that he or she suffered what is often termed a 
materially "adverse employment action." See, e.g., Robinson 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citing cases). The District Court then wrote: 
 
       Despite such precedent, the Court does not hold that 
       the acts alleged by Mondzelewski do not, as a matter of 
       law, constitute adverse employment action, although it 
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       does not believe it would be error to do so. For 
       example, Mondzelewski's most tangible complaint-- 
       the change in shifts -- must be discounted because of 
       the common sense notion that a 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
       shift cannot be considered an extreme hardship given 
       most of this country's workers are governed by that 
       shift. 
 
Mondzelewski, 976 F. Supp. at 283-84. The Court thus 
granted summary judgment for the defendants on 
Mondzelewski's retaliation claim, and the court declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the remaining state 
law claims. Mondzelewski then appealed. 
 
In this appeal, we must decide (1) whether the District 
Court correctly concluded that Mondzelewski is not 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA and (2) whether a 
claim for retaliation can be asserted even if the underlying 
disability claim fails. In addition, since the District Court 
stated that it would not be error to hold that Mondzelewski 
had not suffered any "adverse employment action," we will 




We turn first to the District Court's conclusion that 
Mondzelewski is not disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA. Mondzelewski does not challenge the District Court's 
holding that he is not substantially limited in the major life 
activity of lifting, but he contends that the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment against him on the 
question whether his back impairment, coupled with his 
limited education, training, and skills, substantially limits 
his ability to work. We agree. 
 
A. The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating 
against a qualified individual with a disability because of 
the disability, 42 U.S.C. S 12101, and as noted, the term 
"disability" is defined to mean, among other things, "a 
physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual." 42 
U.S.C. S 12102(2)(A).1 Pathmark does not dispute that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In the District Court, Mondzelewski also argued that he was disabled 
under 42 U.S.C. SS 12102(2)(B) and (C) because he has a record of an 
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Mondzelewski's back injury is a "physical impairment," but 
Pathmark argues that this impairment does not 
substantially limit any major life activity. 
 
Although the ADA does not define the term "substantially 
limits," the EEOC regulations provide guidance. See 42 
U.S.C. S 12116 (empowering the EEOC to promulgate 
regulations implementing the ADA); Deane v. Pocono 
Medical Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(regulations entitled to substantial deference). As provided 
by the regulations, the phrase "substantially limits" means 
"[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average 
person in the general population can perform" or 
"[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration under which an individual can perform a 
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, 
manner, or duration under which the average person in the 
general population can perform that same major life 
activity." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii). The regulations 
further provide that, in assessing whether a major life 
activity has been substantially limited, a court should 
consider the following factors: "(i) [t]he nature and severity 
of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of 
the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term 
impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of 
[the impairment] or resulting from the impairment." 29 
C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii). 
 
According to the regulations, "working" is a "major life 
activity." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(i).2 The regulations state that 
an individual is substantially limited in the major life 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
impairment that constitutes a disability and because Pathmark regarded 
him as having such an impairment. The District Court rejected these 
arguments and Mondzelewski has not raised them on appeal. 
 
2. Major life activities also include: "caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning 
. . . ." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(i). This list is not meant to be exhaustive, 
and 
also includes sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 
1630, 
App. S 1630.2(i). In the District Court, Mondzelewski argued that he is 
substantially limited in the major life activities of lifting and working. 
On 
appeal, Mondzelewski argues only that he is substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working. 
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activity of working if there is a significant restriction in the 
ability "to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of 
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person 
having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(j)(3)(i). When analyzing whether there has been a 
substantial limitation on the major life activity of working, 
the regulations provide that the courts may also consider: 
(1) the geographical area to which the individual has 
reasonable access; (2) the job from which the individual has 
been disqualified, and the number and types of jobs 
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities from 
which the individual is also disqualified ("class of jobs"); 
and/or (3) the job from which the individual has been 
disqualified, and the number and types of other jobs not 
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities from 
which the individual is also disqualified ("broad range of 
jobs"). 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3)(ii); see also Deane, 142 F.3d 
at 144 n.7. 
 
On Pathmark's motion for summary judgment, the 
District Court held that Mondzelewski had not provided 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he is substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working. Mondzelewski, 
976 F. Supp. at 281. The Court provided several reasons 
for its holding. We begin with the "most important" basis 
for the District Court's decision. See id. 
 
B. The District Court concluded that, "while 
Mondzelewski's employability problems stem from a 
combination of factors -- limited education, limited job 
skills, advanced age, and lifting restrictions -- the first 
three of these factors dwarf the last one in effect on 
employability." Id. The Court stressed that "[t]o hold 
Mondzelewski is substantially limited in the major life 
activity of work would permit him to gain protection from 
the ADA for personal characteristics that have nothing to 
do with his impairment." Id. We conclude that the District 
Court's legal analysis was flawed because, as the ADA 
regulations explicitly provide, a court should consider the 
individual's "training, skills and abilities" in determining 
whether the individual is substantially limited in the major 
life activity of working. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 
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Under the EEOC's interpretive guidelines,3  determining 
whether an individual is substantially limited in one or 
more of the major life activities requires a two-step 
analysis. First, the court determines whether the individual 
is substantially limited in any major life activity other than 
working, such as walking, seeing, or hearing. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 
1630, App. S 1630.2(j). In making this determination, the 
court compares the effect of the impairment on that 
individual as compared with the "average person in the 
general population." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(1); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 
1630, App. S 1630.2(j) (stating that the determination must 
be conducted on a case by case basis). For example, "an 
individual who had once been able to walk at an 
extraordinary speed would not be substantially limited in 
the major life activity of walking if, as a result of a physical 
impairment, he or she were only able to walk at an average 
speed, or even at a moderately below average speed." 29 
C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. S 1630.2(j). If the court finds that the 
individual is substantially limited in any of these major life 
activities, the inquiry ends there. Id. On the other hand, if 
the individual is not so limited, the court's next step is to 
determine whether the individual is substantially limited in 
the major life activity of working.4 Id. 
 
In determining whether an individual is substantially 
limited in the ability to work, the proper inquiry, according 
to the relevant regulation, is whether the individual is 
"significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We have afforded these guidelines "a great deal of deference." Matczak 
v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
4. Specifically, the Interpretive Guidelines provide: 
 
       If an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any 
other 
       major life activity, the individual's ability to perform the major 
life 
       activity of working should be considered. If an individual is 
       substantially limited in any other major life activity, no 
       determination should be made as to whether the individual is 
       substantially limited in working. For example, if the individual is 
       blind, i.e., substantially limited in the major life activity of 
seeing, 
       there is no need to determine whether the individual is also 
       substantially limited in the major life activity of working. 
 
29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. S 1630.2(j). 
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class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as 
compared to the average person having comparable training, 
skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis 
added). This approach requires a court to consider the 
individual's training, skills, and abilities in order to 
evaluate "whether the particular impairment constitutes for 
the particular person a significant barrier to employment." 
Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(citing Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986)); 
accord E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 
1099 (D. Haw. 1980) (explaining that "it is the impaired 
individual that must be examined, and not just the 
impairment in the abstract"); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 
S 1630.2(j) (stating that the determination of whether an 
individual is limited in working must be conducted on a 
case by case basis). Because a "person's expertise, 
background, and job expectations are relevant factors in 
defining the class of jobs used to determine whether an 
individual is disabled," Webb, 94 F.3d at 487, the court 
must consider the effect of the impairment on the 
employment prospects of that individual with all of his or 
her relevant personal characteristics. Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 
933. Thus, a substantially limiting impairment for one 
individual may not be substantially limiting for another 
individual with different characteristics. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, 
App. S 1630.2(j); see also McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. 
U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding plaintiff 
with carpal tunnel syndrome not disabled because, among 
other things, she had a college degree); Smith v. Kitterman, 
Inc., 897 F. Supp. 423, 427 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (finding 
plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome had raised material 
issue of fact because of her limited education, training, and 
employment background); Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 
32 F.3d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding plaintiff not 
hindered in her ability to work because of her advanced 
educational degrees). 
 
We accept this approach -- under which an individual's 
training, skills, and abilities are taken into account in 
determining whether the individual is substantially limited 
in the major life activity of working -- because we owe 
"substantial deference" to the EEOC regulation in which it 
is set out, see Deane, 142 F.3d at 143 n.4, and because it 
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is entirely reasonable. Indeed, because the effect that a 
particular impairment will have on a person's ability to 
work varies depending on that person's background and 
skills, it is not easy to envision how any other approach 
could be taken. 
 
C. Under the approach set out above, the District Court 
in the present case was required to determine whether 
Mondzelewski's evidence was sufficient to show that his 
lifting restrictions significantly limit his ability to perform 
the requisite jobs "as compared to the average person 
having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(j)(3)(i). This determination necessitated 
consideration of the "personal characteristics" that the 
District Court's analysis factored out. Whether 
Mondzelewski's lifting restriction would not limit him in the 
major life activity of working if he possessed more or 
different training, skills, or abilities is not determinative; 
rather, the question is whether his ability to work is 
sufficiently limited in light of the training, skills, and 
abilities that he does possess. 
 
In finding that Mondzelewski is not disabled, the District 
Court mistakenly relied on a provision in the EEOC 
guidelines that states: 
 
       [T]he restriction on the performance of the major life 
       activity must be the result of a condition that is an 
       impairment. . . . [A]dvanced age, physical or 
       personality characteristics, and environmental, 
       cultural, and economic disadvantages are not 
       impairments. Consequently, even if such factors 
       substantially limit an individual's ability to perform a 
       major life activity, this limitation will not constitute a 
       disability. 
 
29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. S 1630.2(j). By its plain language, 
this provision relates to the question whether the individual 
has a physical or mental impairment, not whether the 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity and 
thus constitutes a disability. The guideline provides the 
following example: 
 
       [A]n individual who is unable to read because he or she 
       was never taught to read would not be an individual 
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       with a disability because lack of education is not an 
       impairment. 
 
Id. But if an individual who previously held a job that did 
not require much if any reading developed a physical 
impairment, that individual's ability to read would have to 
be taken into account in determining whether he or she 
was "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either 
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes 
as compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the District Court 
committed legal error by failing to conduct the necessary 
individualized assessment of the extent to which 
Mondzelewski's back condition coupled with his personal 
characteristics substantially limits his ability to work. 
 
D. The District Court also suggested that the 
defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Count I 
because the report of Mondzelewski's vocational expert 
failed to "relate the effect of Mondzelewski's `medium duty' 
restrictions on his ability to perform jobs in the economy" 
and failed to "quantify the number or type of jobs he is 
precluded from performing due to those restrictions." 
Mondzelewski, 976 F. Supp. at 281. We conclude, however, 
that this report is sufficient to show for the purpose of 
surviving summary judgment that Mondzelewski was 
"significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a 
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. 
. . ." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Cf. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 
S 1630.2(j) (stating that the terms "number and types of 
jobs" are not intended to impose an onerous evidentiary 
burden but are meant only to require evidence of the 
approximate number of jobs from which the individual is 
precluded from working). 
 
Yohe's report recounted Mondzelewski's educational and 
vocational background and reported that Mondzelewski had 
received "extremely low" scores on an achievement test and 
a career ability placement test that Yohe had administered. 
App. 162. According to his report, Yohe compared 
Mondzelewski's profile "to each of the almost 13,000 jobs 
listed in the [Department of Labor's] Dictionary of 
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Occupational Titles and found that "there were a total of 
eight positions that would be suitable for him that 
essentially involve unskilled work." App. 163. Yohe stated 
that his investigation showed that for these positions there 
were "very low employment opportunities" in 
Mondzelewski's geographical area. Id. He concluded: 
 
       In essence, the best that could be hoped for . . . him, 
       outside of his Pathmark situation, would be a 
       minimum wage type of position in an unskilled light or 
       medium duty capacity. For him to obtain these types of 
       jobs, he would likely need some sort of assistance from 
       a professional Rehabilitation Specialist. 
 
App. 164. Whatever else may be said of Yohe's report, we 
believe that it is sufficient to show for present purposes 
that Mondzelewski is "significantly restricted in the ability 
to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in 
various classes as compared to the average person having 
comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(j)(3)(i). 
 
We reject Pathmark's argument that Mondzelewski 
cannot be substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working because he is now working. In determining 
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life 
activity, a court must examine the individual's situation 
without accommodation for the individual's impairment. 
Matczak, 136 F.3d at 937; see also, e.g., Washington v. 
HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 
1998). Here, Pathmark granted Mondzelewski's request for 
"assistance with lifting of over fifty pounds and with 
frequent carrying of over twenty-five pounds." Appellees' Br. 
at 3. Thus, the mere fact that Mondzelewski has been able 
to continue to perform his job with accommodation does 
not necessarily mean that he is not disabled. 
 
In sum, we hold that the question whether 
Mondzelewski's impairment substantially limits him in the 
major life activity of working cannot be resolved at the 




A. Mondzelewski next challenges the District Court's 
decision to grant summary judgment to Pathmark on his 
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retaliation claim. While recognizing that persons who do not 
have a disability but "who in good faith file formal disability 
discrimination charges with [the appropriate state agency] 
or [the] EEOC" may assert a retaliation claim, 976 F. Supp. 
at 284, the District Court held that "Mondzelewski -- who 
is not disabled -- cannot recover under the ADA for the 
particular acts of harassment he has alleged." Id. The Court 
added that "individuals who are not disabled cannot claim 
the protections of the ADA for the more trivial acts of 
harassment that may be visited upon them in response to 
their requests for assistance." Id. The District Court thus 
suggested that a retaliation claim can be brought by a 
person who is adjudged not to have a disability only if that 
person filed a formal ADA complaint and/or suffered a 
more severe form of retaliation than would otherwise be 
required. Id. 
 
After the District Court's decision, this Court held that "a 
person's status as a `qualified individual with a disability' is 
not relevant in assessing the person's claim for retaliation 
under the ADA." Krouse v. American Sterilizer, Co., 126 
F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court wrote: 
 
       By its own terms, the ADA retaliation provision 
       protects "any individual" who has opposed any act or 
       practice made unlawful by the ADA or who has made 
       a charge under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a). This 
       differs from the scope of the ADA disability 
       discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a), which 
       may be invoked only by a "qualified individual with a 
       disability." An individual who is adjudged not to be a 
       "qualified individual with a disability" may still pursue 
       a retaliation claim under the ADA. 
 
Id. at 502. Under this analysis, we see no basis for holding 
that a person who is adjudged not to have a disability may 
not assert a retaliation claim based on some form of 
protected activity other than the filing of a formal 
complaint. Nor do we see any basis for holding that such a 
person must have suffered some form of retaliation that is 
more severe than the statute would otherwise demand. 
Consequently, Krouse necessitates reversal here. 
 
B. Although the District Court did not squarely hold 
that Mondzelewski's retaliation claim could not survive 
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summary judgment because the evidence did not show that 
Mondzelewski had suffered an "adverse employment 
action," the Court stated that "it does not believe it would 
be error" to so hold. Mondzelewski, 976 F. Supp. at 284. In 
light of this statement, we find it necessary to address this 
issue. 
 
Mondzelewski argues that "[p]erhaps the most egregious 
actions" taken against him were the "use of`punishment 
shifts.' " Appellant's Br. at 30. The District Court, however, 
wrote that, while this was "Mondzelewski's most tangible 
complaint," "the change in shifts . . . must be discounted 
because of the common sense notion that a 9:00 a.m. to 
5:00 p.m. shift cannot be considered an extreme hardship 
given most of this country's workers are governed by that 
shift." Mondzelewski, 976 F. Supp. at 284. We are unable 
to agree with the District Court's analysis and instead hold 
that the change in Mondzelewski's shifts could be found to 
constitute a change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
his employment and thus to fall within the prohibition of 42 
U.S.C. S 12203(a). 
 
This provision states in pertinent part: 
 
       No person shall discriminate against any individual 
       because such individual has opposed any act or 
       practice made unlawful by this chapter . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12203(a). As we have noted, see Krouse, 126 
F.3d at 500, this provision resembles Section 704 of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-3(a), 
which makes it an unlawful employment practice to 
"discriminate" against an employee "because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter. . . ." Both provisions make it 
unlawful to "discriminate" against an employee in 
retaliation for protected conduct. 
 
In Title VII cases, our Court and others have interpreted 
"discriminat[ion]" to mean conduct that falls within the 
basic prohibition against employment discrimination found 
in 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1), which makes it an "unlawful 
employment practice" to discriminate with respect to 
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment." See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 
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1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing cases). Courts customarily 
express this concept by stating that a retaliation plaintiff 
must show that he or she suffered a "materially adverse 
employment action." Id. (quoting McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 
F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1996)). In view of the resemblance 
between 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a) and 42 U.S.C.S 2000e-3(a), a 
similar approach is appropriate here. Consequently, we 
interpret the concept of "discriminat[ion]" under 42 U.S.C. 
S 12203(a) to mean discrimination "in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a). We reiterate, however, 
as we observed in Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300, that minor 
or trivial actions that merely make an employee "unhappy" 
are not sufficient to qualify as retaliation under the ADA, 
for otherwise every action that an "irritable, chip-on-the- 
shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a 
discrimination suit."5 Id. (citing Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 
F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 
We hold that Mondzelewski proffered evidence sufficient 
to establish for present purposes that the change in his 
schedule may have altered the "terms, conditions, or 
privileges" of his employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
S 12203(a). He proffered evidence that meat workers 
generally worked shifts that provided them with certain 
periods of free time and that did not require them to work 
weekend evenings consistently. His evidence suggested that 
his fellow employees considered this type of schedule to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Mondzelewski seems to assert that because the alleged harassment 
caused him to suffer a "nervous breakdown," the acts are per se 
retaliatory under the ADA. Mondzelewski erroneously draws support 
from Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). The Court, 
however, 
did not set forth a per se rule that if a person suffers "tangible 
psychological injury," the employer must have engaged in "adverse 
employment action." Instead, the Court set forth an objective standard: 
whether a reasonable person would find the conduct hostile or abusive. 
If an individual's hypersensitivity causes him or her to suffer tangible 
psychological harm that a reasonable person would not suffer under 
similar circumstances, then that individual cannot seek protection from 
the ADA's anti-retaliation provision. 
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a highly desirable benefit. Although Mondzelewski 
previously had worked under the typical meat worker's 
schedule, after his second injury, he was singled out to 
work a different shift. This shift left him none of the 
customary free time and required him to work every 
Saturday evening. Moreover, he proffered affidavits of fellow 
employees stating that only workers that Pathmark 
intended to punish were assigned to this undesirable shift. 
Indeed, according to these affidavits, workers referred to 
these shifts as "punishment shifts." We find this evidence 
sufficient to raise a triable question as to whether 
Mondzelewski's terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment were altered. 
 
Assigning an employee to an undesirable schedule can be 
more than a "trivial" or minor change in the employee's 
working conditions. See Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls 
Police Dep't, 98 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 1996) (under Title 
VII, appointment to undesirable police assignment 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment on retaliation 
claim); Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(under Title VII, holding adverse action does not require 
loss of money or benefits but rather may consist of changes 
in location, duties, perks, or other basic aspects of the job); 
Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(under Title VII, holding district court's conclusion, i.e., a 
change to night shift constitutes sufficient evidence of 
retaliatory job assignment, not clearly erroneous), overruled 
on other grounds, Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 228 n.2 
(5th Cir. 1990); McGill v. Board. of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 
780 (7th Cir. 1979) (under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, teacher 
transferred to a less desirable school is retaliation for 
protected speech); Florence v. Runyon, 990 F. Supp. 485, 
498 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (under Title VII, denying summary 
judgment where transfer to new position with different work 
hours raised material issue of fact as to whether plaintiff 
suffered adverse employment action); Khan v. Cook County, 
No. 96-C-1113, 1996 WL 432410, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 
1996) (under the ADA, refusing to hold as a matter of law 
that a transfer to the night shift does not constitute adverse 
action); Snodgrass v. Brown, No. 89-1171-K, 1990 WL 
198431, at *17 (D. Kan. Nov. 26, 1990) (under Title VII, 
concluding that changes in employee's schedule raised 
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material issue of fact as to whether plaintiff suffered 
adverse employment action); Maddox v. County of San 
Mateo, 746 F. Supp. 947, 953 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (under Title 
VII, permitting retaliation claim where, among other things, 
employer refused to transfer plaintiff from graveyard shift); 
see also 2 EEOC Compliance Manual 613:0004, at 613.3 
(BNA June 1986) ("Title VII prohibits discrimination with 
respect to practices or activities such as length of 
employment contract, hours of work, or attendance since 
they are terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."). 
Cf. 29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (obligation to bargain collectively with 
respect to, among other things, "hours . . . and other terms 
and conditions of employment") (emphasis added); Meat 
Cutters Locals v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965) 
("the particular hours of the day and the particular days of 
the week during which employees shall be required to work 
are subjects well within the realm of `wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment' about which 
employers and unions must bargain"); Long Lake Lumber 
Co., 160 NLRB 1475 (1966) (changing employee's schedule 
from normal workweek to a Tuesday through Saturday 
workweek violated National Labor Relations Act). Thus, we 
believe that Mondzelewski has produced evidence that 
raises a genuine issue as to whether Pathmark altered his 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, in violation 
of 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a), when it changed his work 
schedule. 
 
We readily agree with the District Court's observation 
that assignment to a 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. shift "cannot 
be considered an extreme hardship given most of this 
country's workers are governed by that shift." 
Mondzelewski, 976 F. Supp. at 284. But the critical 
question for present purposes is not whether Mondzelewski 
suffered an "extreme hardship," but whether his terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment were altered. 
Nothing in the ADA suggests that employers are prohibited 
from taking only those retaliatory actions that impose an 
"extreme hardship." To be sure, the relatively mild nature of 
Pathmark's allegedly retaliatory conduct may not be 
without legal or practical significance, but it is not 
dispositive with respect to the narrow legal question now 
before us regarding 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a). 
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Although the District Court did not expressly address the 
other alleged acts of retaliation on which Mondzelewski 
relies, it appears that the Court may have applied the same 
"extreme hardship" test there as well. Moreover, the Court 
did not address 42 U.S.C. S 12203(b), which arguably 
sweeps more broadly than 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a). Subsection 
(b) provides in pertinent part that it is "unlawful to coerce, 
intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual . . . on 
account of his or her having . . . exercise[d] . . . any right 
granted or protected by this chapter." On remand, the 
Court should consider whether Mondzelewski has proffered 
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment under this 
subsection as well as under subsection (a). 
 
Pathmark has urged us to affirm the grant of summary 
judgment on the retaliation claim on several alternative 
grounds. Pathmark contends that Mondzelewski did not 
make a retaliation charge in his EEOC complaint. 
Pathmark also argues that it proffered a legitimate 
explanation for assigning Mondzelewski to the shifts in 
question -- viz., because it was better able to provide 
reasonable accommodation for his lifting restrictions during 
those shifts -- and that Mondzelewski failed to raise a 
triable issue with respect to Pathmark's explanation. The 
District Court did not reach these issues, and we decline to 
reach them at this time. Pathmark can renew these 




For the reasons explained above, we reverse the grant of 
summary judgment on Counts I and II and remand for 
further proceedings. We also vacate the dismissal of the 
counts asserting state-law claims so that the District Court 
can reassess its decision relating to those counts in light of 
its disposition on remand of the remaining federal claims. 
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